International health quarantine
International health quarantine first appeared in the 14 th Century. In Europe, the earliest industrial and commercial cities emerged in the North Italy and along the Mediterranean. With development of foreign trade, increasing naval transportation and newly-explored shipping routes, infectious diseases like plague, cholera swept through Europe, and spread out. Europe experienced the most deadly infectious disease outbreak in the history when the 'Black Death', the pandemic of bubonic plague in 1347, killed a third of the human population (4) . To prevent the spread of these diseases, some countries adopted quarantine of ships which came from epidemic areas. The term "quarantine" dates back to the 14 th century when people arriving from plague-infected areas to the port of Ragusa, Italy were isolated. This period of isolation was set at 40 days and the word quarantine derived from the word "quaranta" the Italian term for "forty". In 1710, United Kingdom established the quarantine organization, and countries across Eurasia followed the example of UK (5) .
International Health Regulations
By the end of the 19 th century, many international conferences on disease control had been held, focusing on the containment of epidemics within their regions of origin. The first International Sanitary Convention of 1892, became the International Sanitary Regulations. Through many revisions, in 1951, WHO adopted the existing conventions at the time as the International Sanitary Regulations, which became binding on WHO member states. However, international sanitary regulations of 1951 highlighted that measures at POE alone could prevent the spread of infectious diseases across international borders. It intended to monitor and control only six serious infectious diseases: The Sanitary Regulations (1951) were renamed as the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969 (5) . However, over time, compliance with the regulations diminished, and the global surveillance system under the IHR (1969) gradually faded, diminished in relevance and effectiveness (5) . With the threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases such as Ebola virus in Congo and the epidemic of plague in India in the 1990's, the inadequacy of mechanisms available for controlling the cross-border outbreaks were recognised, resulting in a resolution at the World Health Assembly in 1995. This resolution was to revise the IHR (1969), to help in global governance of disease reporting and responses. However, there was only little progress until the emergence of the SARS virus in 2003, which lead to a revised IHR to be adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005, which came into force in 2007 (6) .
The IHR (2005) has shifted the focus of infectious disease in three ways: (a) not limited to any specific diseases, and covers all public health emergencies (b) replaced the historical lists of notifiable diseases with an algorithm (c) 'control at boarders' is supplemented by 'containment at the source', and use 'adapted response' based on real time epidemiological evidence rather than 'pre-determined' measures (6) .
The goal of the IHR (2005) is the global public health security and to prevent the spread of diseases and events across international borders. They are a set of legally binding regulations, for the WHO member states and provides a global framework agreed upon by the member states, for the collective international management of epidemics and other public health emergencies while minimizing disruption to travel, trade and economies, and at the same time respecting individual human rights (6) . Countries have agreed to share information promptly and to develop and sustain the core capacities needed. So, essentially, time tested virtues of human conditions assume legal and scientific dimensions to ensure human protection. This commitment laid the foundation for a global disease detection and response network, capable of containing emerging disease threats. The international response required today is not only to the known, but also to the unknown diseases that may arise from acute environmental or climatic changes and from industrial pollution and accidents that may put millions of people at risk in several countries.
The IHR (2005) identifies several public health hazards: (a) biological (infectious, zoonotic, food born), (b) chemical (c) radio-nuclear material which may cause an international public health emergency. They can be manifested as imported human cases, infected or contaminated vectors or contaminated goods. The implementation of IHR (2005) requires mobilization of national resources; for strengthening the national capacity for early detection of unusual diseases or events by effective national surveillance and for response (investigation, control measures) at all levels (local, regional, and national) (6) .
Public health events that spread through points of entry in the recent past

Biological (infectious, zoonotic, food born) events
There are numerous examples where infectious diseases and events have spread across the globe causing great adverse health, economic and social consequences. In the past centuries, outbreaks of yellow fever were reported in the North America (Charleston, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia etc) and Europe (England, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Although the disease has never been reported in Asia, the region is always at risk, due to presence of the conditions required for transmission. Therefore travellers, particularly those arriving to Asia from Africa or Latin America are required to have a certificate of yellow fever vaccination (1) .
There was no better eye opener to the world than the Plague outbreak in India in 1994 of the risk of re-emergence of infectious diseases. The outbreak occurred in five states, resulting in almost 700 suspected cases and 56 deaths. The international media attention given resulted in devastating economic consequences for India, several countries over-reacted exceeding the measures in IHR (1969) and imposed unnecessary travel and trade restrictions. Consequently, India had lost 1.7 billion US dollars in trade and travel (1) . (7, 8) .
Infectious disease outbreaks can be accidental or deliberate. An activity related to laboratory research has the potential for outbreaks due to accidental release of infectious agents as a result of breaches in biosafety measures. However the Anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001, malicious releases of dangerous pathogens, was a form of bioterrorism that reminded the world of the importance of international health security. Similarly after eradication of smallpox was certified, allegations have been made that some countries and terrorist groups are storing smallpox virus, and its potential as a bioterrorist threat is causing major concerns in many industrialized countries (1) . (3) . The estimated loss to the Mexican economy due to influenza was at 0.3 to 0.5 percent of GDP for 2009 and Mexican citizens traveling abroad became subjects of discrimination (1) . In a world of constant human migration, the greatest threat to international health security would be an avian influenza pandemic. With the growth of global trade and travel, a localized epidemic can transform into a pandemic rapidly, with little time to prepare a public health response. Influenza pandemics occur when two key factors converge: an influenza virus emerging with the ability to cause sustained humanto-human transmission, and the human population has little or no immunity against the virus. The continuing possibility of pandemics is a major threat to global public health security, The main reasons for this increased risk are the occurrence of these diseases in developing countries where the ability to detect and respond rapidly is limited. The newly emerging diseases in humans are often due to a breach in barrier between humans and animals, permitting microbes that infect animals to cause human infection as well (3).
Contaminated food is an important source of food borne diseases. Although the safety of food has dramatically improved over the last 50 years, foodborne outbreaks from microbial contamination, chemicals and toxins are common in many countries. Trading of contaminated food between countries increases the potential for outbreaks. Cholera remains a global threat to public health security since its spread across the globe in the 19th century, from the Ganges delta in India. Six subsequent pandemics have killed millions of people across the world. The current pandemic started in South Asia in 1961.
Cholera is now endemic in many countries. The true burden of cholera is underreported due to limitations in surveillance systems and fear of trade and travel sanctions. Countries neighbouring cholera -affected areas are encouraged to strengthen disease surveillance and national preparedness to rapidly detect and respond to outbreaks if it spreads across borders (1) .
Chemical and radio-nuclear material related public health events
We have a dark and sad memory of our neighbour India succumbing to an industrial disaster. The most significant chemical accident recorded in history was the Bhopal disaster in India in 1984, in which over 500,000 people were exposed and more than 3,000 people were killed after a highly toxic vapour (methyl isocyanate) was released at a Union Carbide pesticides factory. The toxic substance spread into and around the areas near the plant (1) . Chernobyl disaster, the worst nuclear plant accident in history occurred in 1986 in Ukraine, resulted in the radioactive contamination of the surrounding geographical area, which spread over much of the western USSR and Europe, resulting in the evacuation and resettlement of over 336,000 people. It is the first level 7 event (the maximum classification) on the International Nuclear Event Scale, 400 times more radioactive material released than by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Less severe nuclear accidents have been reported in Japan. The more recent event in 2011, at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station, Japan occurred shortly after the earthquake and tsunami hit Japan (9).
The universal vulnerability for all these hazards indicates the need for a coordinated international response in terms of international public health security. In the age of fast and furious information exchange, what sort of a response do public health emergencies evoke?
Public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC)
A PHEIC is an extraordinary event which is determined, to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated international response (10) . The responsibility of determining whether an event is a PHEIC lies with the WHO Director-General and requires the convening of the IHR Emergency Committee Temporary recommendations include health measures to be implemented by the country experiencing the PHEIC, or by other countries, to prevent or reduce the international spread and avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic (10) .
Events detected by the national surveillance system, are assessed according to the decision instrument of the WHO. Four diseases are always notifiable irrespective of the number of cases i.e. polio (wild-type polio virus), smallpox, human influenza new subtype, SARS; some are potentially notifiable-cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, VHF (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), West Nile Fever, or other diseases that are of special national or regional concern, e.g. dengue fever, Rift Valley fever, and meningococcal diseases because they have demonstrated the ability to cause serious public health impact and to spread rapidity internationally. The four criteria given by the WHO need to be fulfilled for the notification: (a) public health impact is serious (b) the event is unusual or unexpected (c) has significant risk of international spread (d) risk of international travel or trade restriction (10) .
A PHEIC declaration was first issued in April 2009 when the H1N1 pandemic was in phase 3 (11) ; the second PHEIC declaration was issued in May 2014 with the resurgence of polio in Syria after its neareradication (12 The inter-connected survival of human race in this complex age of global cohesion and global division, global governance is central for the health and safety of humanity. The IHR can be used as a tool for pandemic preparedness and response within the context of global health governance or for 'governing' the global response to outbreaks. The IHR is the strongest existing tool for global health governance, integrating stakeholders beyond the major state powers into the global disease detection and response.
The IHR (2005) expanded the WHO's authority in global health governance and allowed to use external sources of information to identify possible public health emergencies, to make inquiries from national authorities based on unofficial information sources and to state recommendations even in the absence of cooperation or agreement from affected Member States (5) .
The H1N1 influenza outbreak in 2009 tested the revised IHR (2005) and demonstrated its shortcomings, such as the dependence on national capacities and additional trade, and travel recommendations. Following its declaration as a PHEIC, there were concerns whether WHO should hold authority to declare a pandemic, given the economic consequences of approximately $18 billion for the decision. The move from pandemic alert level 4 to 5 led to immediate economic consequences, particularly for travel and trade-dependent industries. Many national decision makers strongly pressured WHO to consider illness severity in moving past level 5, fearing that economic impacts of the declaration would be disproportionately greater to the actual disease threat (8) .
The third PHEIC due to the outbreak of Ebola in Guinea in December 2013, spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone in March 2014, At least 10,000 people have died from the disease. The CDC estimated that earlier intervention could have prevented the disease's spread, with less than 5,000 people dead (8) . There is criticism that there was a delay in declaring a PHEIC by the WHO for the Ebola outbreak that probably enabled it to spread rapidly. The rising number of infections and deaths in Liberia and Sierra Leone, prompted the UN Security Council to issue a landmark resolution on 18 September 2014 establishing the UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER) (8) . The biggest criticism of the current approach is that IHR is heavily focused on formal points of entry and exit, and did not take into account the human mobility aspects and the porous border crossings people take. In addition, emphasis was mostly on health rather than meaningful inter-sectoral and multi-disciplinary coordination. Failure to contain the Ebola outbreak resulted in recognizing the gaps in global governance, in terms of global health security. As a result USA launched its Global Health Security Agenda in 2014 "to accelerate progress toward a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats and to promote global health security as an international security priority" (8) . The lesson from Ebola has urged to return to the content of IHR to evaluate how to better prepare countries and the WHO for the next outbreak. This raises questions regarding the extent to which the IHR (2005) and the associated powers conferred on WHO can serve as a framework for global governance of disease control. If IHR (2005) were to serve as an effective framework for global governance of disease control, the regulations should be well operationalized in all member countries, which is yet to happen.
Failure in fully operationalizing global governance of disease through IHR (2005)
It is possible to recognize some key factors that have contributed to the failures of fully operationalizing the concept of global governance of disease through IHR (2005) (7, 8, 14) . (a) For most countries in the world there are many competing priorities, growing non-communicable disease burdens, etc., than chemical and radiological safety efforts, especially in the absence of obvious risks. (b) There was no additional financing, or a standing fund to support countries and the Development partners have often proved as scared by the complex demands of implementing it. (c) The legally binding nature of IHR (2005) does not include an enforcement mechanism for the counties which fail to comply. There is no formal penalty for failure to notify WHO of a potential PHEIC, or for failure to achieve core capacities. WHO has no power to force nations to comply with IHR (2005) obligations. (d) The selfreporting adopted to monitor the implementation of IHR is unreliable and there is no robust mechanism for independent monitoring of its implementation. (e) many low-and middle-income countries do not have the capacities to implement such a framework-core capacities depend on an adequately trained and equipped public health workforce, a strong surveillance and response framework, a functional national public health laboratory network, a strong legal and regulatory foundation, and robust multi-sectoral coordination. As of 2013, only a one fifth of countries had achieved all of the core capacities required and 110 countries requested a 2-year extension, approximately 80% of the countries have not met their international legal obligations to implement IHR. (f) IHR Monitoring Framework has 20 country-level indicators. It describes only the outcomes that countries should achieve, but does not prescribe how countries should achieve these. There is an unmet need for specific technical assistance, especially for developing capacities for non-infectious hazards. (g) Incorporating surveillance and response at POE, needs lot of inter-sectoral collaboration, and are challenging for most countries (7, 8, 14) .
As a result countries have failed to ensure that WHO has the full capacity for 'governing' and fully operationalizing the global response to outbreaks. It is also in this context that one has to look at how IHR relates to public health security in Sri Lanka.
Public Health Security at the Points of Entry to Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka's geographical location in the Indian Ocean has historically been of strategic importance for exploration, commerce and cultural exchange. Sri Lanka's points of entry (POE) comprise of two international airports (Katunayake and Mattala) and four sea ports (Colombo, Galle, Hambantota, Trincomalee). Since the end of the conflicts in the north and the east, Sri Lanka has taken a steep development path with the building of new air ports and sea ports, increasing global business investments; and a rapidly growing tourist industry, which are all associated resulting in increased international migration flow.
The routine activities carried out at the POE mainly focus on preventing the introduction of infectious diseases into Sri Lanka. History of port health laws in Sri Lanka dates back to 1897 with the establishment of the 'Quarantine and Prevention of Diseases' Act, which stipulates provisions for preventing the introduction of all contagious and infectious diseases into Sri Lanka (15) .
In addition there are more unique activities at the POE targeting the national programmes. Sri Lanka has now interrupted malaria transmission and sustained it -resulting in no indigenous malaria cases reported since October 2012 (16) . Increased travel to SL from malaria endemic countries in the form of business, tourism, labour or refugees and with the continued presence of the anophiline vectors in most parts of the country make Sri Lanka vulnerable to reintroduction of malaria. Screening using the Rapid Diagnostic Test and prophylaxis for Malaria is carried out at the POE for travellers and returning irregular migrants from Malaria endemic countries. by the Anti-Malaria Campaign in collaboration with the Department of Immigration and when relevant, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to ensure that travellers as well as returning irregular migrants migrants are Sri Lankan citizens stranded in Malaria endemic countries. However, the large number of inbound labour migrants coming with tourist visa from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh poses a formidable threat of re-introduction of local transmission. There were instances in the recent past of maritime interceptions or sea rescues of smuggled and trafficked victims -the 'boat people' voyaging the Indian Ocean and making landings in Sri Lanka. They are potential carriers of communicable diseases including malaria. The MERS-CoV is another threat to public health security to Sri Lanka. Given the large number of labour migrants both from the Middle East and South Korea, returning Hajj pilgrims, tourists, resident visa holders and irregular migrants who have visited the Middle East is always a risk of MERS being introduced to Sri Lanka. It is estimated that 10% of Sri Lanka's population work as international labor migrants, with 93% of them residing in the Middle East, with the majority departing to Saudi Arabia, which has reported the largest number of MERS-CoV cases (17) . The recent evidence for the tendency of the disease spreading within family clusters may be important in the context of the majority of the Sri Lankan work force in the Middle East being employed as house maids (7) . In addition Sri Lanka also promotes male labour migration to South Korea. WHO does not advise special screening at POE or any travel or trade restrictions. At present as a part of the preparedness plan, there is a mechanism in place to monitor and follow up returnees form MER-CoV reporting countries particularly South Korea. This operate through the airports, the central Epidemiology Unit and the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) system in the country. 
Capacities to implement IHR (2005) in Sri Lanka
The core capacities are the capacities needed to detect, assess, notify and report and respond to public health events or emergencies of national and international concern. Article 5 and Annex 1a of the IHR (2005) requires member states to identify service and system gaps. An assessment of the public health infrastructure, facilities and core capacities at POE to Sri Lanka to implement IHR (2005) was carried out in 2009 with the financial support from the World Bank and the WHO and an action plan was developed based on the findings. The eight core capacities at the POE needed to detect, assess, notify and respond to a PHEIC were again evaluated in September 2013 by the Directorate for Quarantine with technical support of the IOM using a multi-method approach. The IHR core capacity monitoring framework developed by the WHO (18) Similarly control of vectors and reservoirs in and near POE is required to prevent transport an infectious agent into or out of the country and is partly addressed by the Prevention of Mosquito Breeding Act (2007) which has provisions to prevent and eradicate mosquito breeding sites in and near a POE. If not properly controlled, mosquitos could board ships, breed and be carried overseas. Furthermore, mosquitos on board can, in turn, spread disease to POE in other countries. However the authority has not been delegated to MO-PH or PHI-PH for implementing the Food Act or MO-PH for implementing Prevention of Mosquito Breeding Act in and near POE.
Gaps in the national capacity for public health security at the POE to Sri Lanka
Despite the gaps in the existing legislation to prevent entry of infectious diseases and food-borne diseases, there are legal provisions related to zoonotic, chemical and radio-nuclear hazards. Animal Diseases Act (1992) (23) provides legal authority for control of import and export of animals and products in and out of the country. Part III of the Act includes powers related to of Minister to declare any port or other place as being infected with disease, power of Ports Authority to refuse entry to vessels carrying any infected or diseased animal, quarantine, protective zone etc. Animal Quarantine Units established within the POE implement the regulations. Atomic Energy Authority Act (1969) (24) has provisions control of importation, exportation, production, acquisition, treatment, storage, transport and disposal of radioactive materials. The National Environmental Act, (2000) (25) 
C.
A training need assessment (31) was conducted among Port Health staff at all POE to in 2014 using a pre-tested, self-administered questionnaire which covered 34 activities under 12 areas specified in the SOP. A Training manual was prepared based on the priority training needs identified, with the aim of carrying out regular in-service training programmes and to ensure availability of a minimum number of trained personals needed to meet IHR requirements. A new monitoring and evaluation mechanism through 'quarterly reviews' for the Port Health staff at all POE were introduced at the Directorate-Quarantine to ensure the adherence to the SOPs and implementation of IHR at the POE. In addition, job descriptions were developed for the Port Health staff at all POE to enable effective implementation of IHR (2005) 
D.
A web based Border Health Information System was developed to capture data related to routine procedures as well as those related to PHEIC. The paper based record keeping at POE was converted to a real-time comprehensive e-surveillance system where data could be collected in a timely and complete manner. This data entering interphase is equipped with mechanisms to minimize errors in data entry and thereby ensure the quality of data. The data are entered using a portable web-linked devise by the MO-PH visiting Ship or the Aircraft, and are fed to the system immediately. The system sends alerts and notifications to the MO in-charge of the relevant POE and to the Director-Quarantine. The system also generates periodical reports and returns automatically and allows running of queries and analyses within the system. The system will be linked to reporting systems of to the stakeholder agencies related to implementation of IHR in the future.
Concluding remarks
Institutionalizing IHRs as part of the routine health system requires increased awareness among policymakers, building inter-sectoral relationships, and resources. The best practices of Sri Lanka could be used to develop or to validate national strategies in other countries in the region. Enhancing public health security at POE to Sri Lanka does not stop at saving lives of people, but goes far beyond. It will be a key factor in establishing a good international image for the country, minimizing any potential travel and trade restrictions being imposed on the country, building public trust, and minimizing social and political turmoil in a potential PHEIC situation. All of this brings to a core truth. Migration health, global measures, human security and health are not simple science. It is a human problem. It is sensitive. It is intricately interlaced with human rights and human dignity. Good governance, good legislature, good implementation of laws and regulations are at the heart of all good outcomes.
